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CARD DIVISION 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS 
DIVISION OF THE ARMY BALLISTIC MISSILE 
AGENCY TO THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION. 


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COMMITTEE ON 

SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS.] 
U.S. HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES 


EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 


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H.J. Res. 567 


FEBRUARY 3, 1960 


[No. 2] 


Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics 



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51377 


UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : I960 









COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS 

OVERTON BROOKS. Louisiana. Chairman 


JOHN W. McCORMACK, Massachusetts 
GEORGE P. MILLER, California 
OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas 
VICTOR L. ANFUSO, New York 
B. F. SISK, California 
ERWIN MITCHELL, Georgia 
JAMES M. QUIGLEY, Pennsylvania 
LEONARD G. WOLF, Iowa 
JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota 
KEN HECHLER, West Virginia 
EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut 
WALTER H. MOELLER, Ohio 
DAVID S. KING, Utah 
J. EDWARD ROUSH, Indiana 


JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr., Massachusetts 
JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania 
GORDON L. MCDONOUGH, California 
J. EDGAR CHENOWETH, Colorado 
FRANK C. OSMERS, Jr., New Jersey 
WILLIAM K. VAN PELT, Wisconsin 
A. D. BAUMHART, Jr., Ohio 
PERKINS BASS, New Hampshire 
R. WALTER RIEHLMAN, New York 


Charles F. Ducander, Executive Director and Chief Counsel 
Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, Technical Director 
Spencer M. Beresford, Special Counsel 
Philip B. Yeager, Special Consultant 
John A. Carstarphen, Jr., Chief Clerk 
Richard P. Hines, Staff Consultant 
Lt. Ool. Francis J. Dillon, Jr., Staff Consultant 
Raymond Wilcove, Staff Consultant 


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CONTENTS 


Statement of— Page 

Brucker, Hon. Wilber M., Secretary of the Army_ 2 


Horner, Richard, Associate Director, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration__ 

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army_ 

Siepert, Albert F., Director, Business Administration, National Aero¬ 
nautics and Space Administration_ 

York, Dr. Herbert F., Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 

Department of Defense_ 

H.J. Res. 567_ 

Memorandum for the President re responsibility and organization for cer¬ 
tain space activities_ 

Agreement between the Department of the Army and NASA on the objec¬ 
tives and guidelines for the implementation of the Presidential decision 

to transfer a portion of ABM A to NASA_ 

Charts^: 

Steps involved in transfer of DOD to NASA- 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration operating organiza¬ 
tion _ 

U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command- 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency_ 

Proposed staffing—Huntsville facility- 

Provision of administrative services- 

Army-NASA transfer of Development Operations Division (ABMA) 
at Huntsville, Ala., facilities- 39 

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TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVI¬ 
SION OF THE ARMY BALLISTIC MISSILE AGENCY TO 
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN¬ 
ISTRATION 


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1960 

House of Representatives, 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

Washington , D.C. 

The committee met at 2:05 p.m., Hon. Overton Brooks (chairman) 
presiding. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order. 

Mr. Fulton. May I make a motion before we start ? 

The Chairman. Well, let me say this: One of the reporters sug¬ 
gested that they will be here at 2:30 and they would like to make 
a picture at that time of all of the committee with the Secretary 
and his staff here, and if it is agreeable with the Secretary and 
his staff, I would like to suspend the committee session at that 
time for that purpose. 

Mr. Fulton. May I make a motion? 

The Chairman. Surely. 

Mr. Fulton. As we have three high-level witnesses here today, 
I would suggest that we dispense with the 5-minute rule and insti¬ 
tute the rule that each member of the committee be afforded one 
question and go down through the committee once that way before 
we start under the 5-minute rule. 

The Chairman. Is there any objection to that suggestion ? 

Mr. Chenoweth. I didn’t get that. 

Mr. Fulton. That each member of the committee in order have 
one question since there are three witnesses at a very high level, 
and then we have the 5-minute rule afterward, but to begin with 
the first time around each member be permitted one question. 

Mr. Chenoweth. Why not do it all at once? 

Mr. Fulton. I am making the motion, and I would hope we 
could agree on it. 

The Chairman. We do have several very important witnesses 
here. It seems to me we ought to hear them all. 

Mr. Chenoweth. Why don’t you wait until we get through and 
see how much time we have ? 

The Chairman. Unless there is any objection, we will see how 
that works out. 

Mr. Fulton. I would like to try it once. 

The Chairman. If there is no objection, it is so ordered. Now, 
Mr. Secretary, I suggest that we proceed with your statement and 

1 



2 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

then the statement of General Lemnitzer, and then the Under Sec¬ 
retary of the Army. Does he have a statement, too, today ? 

Secretary Brucker. No; Secretary Milton will not have a state¬ 
ment, but he says in advance he is going to corroborate everything 
I say. 

The Chairman. That gives us two statements, and my suggestion 
is that we proceed to hear the Secretary and General Lemnitzer 
and then we will proceed with the questions. 

Mr. Secretary, we have adopted you on this committee, as you 
know. You see the flags up here that you sent us and we are not 
forgetting that. We are happy to have you on this and any other 
occasion that you want to come before this committee. 

Secretary Brucker. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. At this point in the record we will insert a copy 
of House Joint [Resolution 567 by Mr. Sisk. 

(The joint resolution follows:) 

[H.J. Res. 567, S6th Cong., 2d sess.] 

JOINT RESOLUTION To effect immediately the transfer of the Development Operations 
Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 

Whereas the President has transmitted to the Congress a plan proposing 
to transfer the Development Operations Division, directed by Doctor Wern- 
her von Braun and known as the Von Braun team, of the Army Ballistic Mis¬ 
sile Agency, Department of the Army, to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration pursuant to section 302 of Public Law 85-568, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 433) ; and 

Whereas clause 2 of subsection (c) of said section authorizing the transfer 
provides that the transfer cannot be effected until a report lies before the Con¬ 
gress for sixty days without the adoption of a concurrent resolution opposing 
the transfer; and 

Whereas the Congress is seriously concerned about the lag in national pro¬ 
grams for space science and exploration ; and 

Whereas the responsibility for overcoming this lag and for promoting vigor¬ 
ously such programs is vested by law in the President and the Administrator 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and 
Whereas the Congress desires to remove any unnecessary obstacles or factors 
in the prosecution of such programs ; and 

Whereas the Congress believes that a waiver of the sixty-day period during 
which the transfer plan must lie before the Congress before taking effect may 
contribute to the speeding up of such programs ; and 

Whereas the Congress believes further that such programs will be materially 
expedited and advanced by maintaining the Von Braun team essentially intact: 
Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled , That the President’s transfer plan transmitted 
with a report of January 14, 1960, shall take effect immediately upon the enact¬ 
ment of this resolution, notwithstanding the provisions of section 302(c) of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 

STATEMENT 0E HON. WILBER M. BRUCKER,, SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY 

Secretary Brucker. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 
I have a short statement here I would like to read and after that 
General Lemnitzer has a statement and we will be ready to answer 
any questions that you may have. 

The Chairman. Do you have copies of your statement, Mr. 
Secretary ? 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 3 

Secretary Brucker. Yes. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great pleasure 
for me to appear before the House Science and Astronautics Com¬ 
mittee at any time. In my opinion your work is of vital importance 
and of tremendous assistance to the people of this Nation and the free 
world in understanding our problems with respect to space. 

In my opening remarks on House Joint Resolution 567 relating to 
the transfer of a portion of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, I would like to 
discuss the basic aspects of this matter. General Lemnitzer, who will 
follow me, will deal more specifically with the details of the proposed 
transfer. 

As you may recall, President Eisenhower issued a statement on 
October 21, 1959, to the effect that the Von Braun team could best 
serve the national interest in our space effort as an integral part of 
NASA. On the 22d of October General Lemnitzer and I issued a 
joint statement assuring the Nation that we would make every effort 
to effect the transfer smoothly, efficiently, and with a minimum of 
disruption to all military and space efforts. Our objective was then, 
as it is today, to effect the transfer without losing a day in our national 
space effort. 

To this end, the Army and NASA went to work immediately to 
develop the neccessary detailed plans. Dr. Glennan and I met on 
several occasions to discuss this matter, and the principal negotiators 
whom we had appointed met with increasing frequency as time pro¬ 
gressed. The result of this effort was an “Agreement Between the 
Army and NASA on the Objectives and Guidelines for the Implemen¬ 
tation of the Presidential Decision To Transfer a Portion of ABMA 
to NASA.” 

Dr. Glennan and I signed this agreement on November 18, 1959. 
With the objectives and guidelines thus established, additional Army 
and NASA teams worked day and night and weekends to produce a 
detailed agreement which Dr. Glennan, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Douglas and I approved on December 16 and 17. This agreement 
served as the basis for the transfer plan presented to the Congress by 
President Eisenhower on January 14. 

As you know, the proposed transfer involves significant personnel, 
equipment, facilities, and fiscal considerations. After careful study 
on the part of both NASA and the Army, we have mutually agreed 
that the optimum target date around which necessary actions should 
be centered is July 1, 1960, the beginning of a new fiscal year. This 
date is particularly desirable from the point of view of program and 
budget transition. General Lemnitzer in his statement will elaborate 
upon some of the other reasons why this date was selected. 

In brief, the detailed agreement which the President’s transfer plan 
would bring into effect provides for the transfer of personnel and 
equipment from the Army to NASA and for the furnishing of an 
integrated facility at Redstone Arsenal to NASA on a long-term lease. 
Virtually all the facilities, personnel and equipment involved are to 
be transferred to NASA on the 1st of July of this year. 

I assume that the intended purpose of House Joint Resolution 567 
is to give early congressional approval to the transfer plan submitted 
by the President, and that it is not intended to interfere by forced 
acceleration with the orderly transition planned for July 1. 


4 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

Upon this assumption I, as Secretary of the Army, express no ob¬ 
jection to adoption of the resolution. 

Now, I would like for you to hear General Lemnitzer’s statement 
and then we are going to subject ourselves to any questions you may 
have. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your 
short, brief, terse but definite statement which will be of great help 
to the committee. 

General, we have copies of your statement and we will be very 
happy to hear you at this time. 

STATEMENT OE GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNXTZEE, CHILE OF STAFF, 

U.S. AEMY 

General Lemnitzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to ap¬ 
pear before your committee and hope that I can assist in your consid¬ 
eration of House Joint Resolution 567 concerning the transfer of Dr. 
von Braun’s group from the Army to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 

As Secretary Brucker has stated, the Department of Defense, the 
Army, and NASA have worked out a detailed agreement to effect 
this transfer expeditiously, smoothly, and efficiently; and with an ab¬ 
solute minimum of inteference to important programs. The selection 
of July 1 as the date to effect the physical transfer of the majority of 
personnel, facilities, and equipment was the result of extensive dis¬ 
cussions among the Department of Defense, the Army, and NASA 
as to the scope of the problem and the extent of administrative work 
involved. 

I will now summarize the detailed agreement developed by the 
Army and NASA—which the President’s plan would bring into ef¬ 
fect—and the manner in which this plan would be implemented. 

The Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Mis¬ 
sile Agency—the von Braun team—presently includes approximately 
4,200 civilian personnel. By mutual agreement with NASA, up to 
350 personnel of the Division will be offered an opportunity to remain 
with the Army in order to continue the Army’s important missile sys¬ 
tems management capability. 

In addition, it is planned to transfer to NASA approximately 815 
supporting personnel from other Army organizations at Redstone 
Arsenal which have been providing services to the Development Oper¬ 
ations Division. Although this number represents only about two- 
thirds of the supporting personnel which NASA will ultimately re¬ 
quire at this location, this action is in recognition of the Army’s per¬ 
sonnel requirements to carry out its continuing mission. 

The determination of personnel to be transferred to NASA in the 
service-support areas will be based upon the types of functions in¬ 
volved. The NASA organizations will assume responsibility for— 

(a) Management control functions such as fiscal, budget, per¬ 
sonnel, and planning. 

(b) Functions involving immediate service to the technical 
groups, such as supply, facility and equipment maintenance, and 
physical security. 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 5 

Stationwide functions such as foundry, perimeter security, and 
utility services will be performed for the new NASA organization by 
the Army on a reimbursable basis. 

The transfer to NASA of the personnel of the Development Oper¬ 
ations Division is now planned to occur on July 1, 1960. Transfer 
of supporting personnel in administrative and management areas from 
organizations outside the Development Operations Division will com¬ 
mence prior to that date, in order that NASA will be able to provide 
administrative support for the Development Operations Division im¬ 
mediately upon its transfer. 

The approximately 250 enlisted military personnel now within the 
Development Operations Division will be phased out over a period 
of 6 months after July 1. 

NASA will be granted the use of approximately 1,200 acres at 
Redstone Arsenal encompassing all the land and facilities, with minor 
exceptions, now used by the Development Operations Division. It is 
planned that— 

(a) The Army Ballistic Missile Agency headquarters office 
building will remain with the Army but will be shared by NASA 
until permanent arrangements can be made. 

(A) Facilities of the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral 
which are utilized by the Development Operations Division will 
be shared by the Army and NASA to assure that the require¬ 
ments of each are met. The facilities now under construction for 
the Pershing and Saturn projects will be assigned to the Army 
and to NASA, respectively. 

( c ) The equipment and supplies required to maintain the re¬ 
search and development capabilities of the Development Opera¬ 
tions Division will be transferred to NASA. The Army will 
retain equipment related primarily to missile systems and a share 
of common use equipment and supplies required for Army 
programs. 

( d ) All unobligated funds allocated for the Saturn project 
and all funds obligated for major contracts on the Saturn project, 
but unexpended, will be transferred to NASA. 

3. Commencing on July 1, 1960, NASA will reimburse the Depart¬ 
ment of the Army for utilities and other services provided to NASA. 
Work performed by the transferred activity for the Army will also 
be on a reimbursable basis. 

In summary, the Army and NASA have developed detailed agree¬ 
ments to effect the transfer to NASA smoothly, efficiently, and with 
an absolute minimum of interference to assigned projects. Assuming 
that the joint resolution is not intented to alter this plan, I perceive 
no objection to its adoption. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, General. We appreciate 
your fine, straightforward, forthright statement. 

Mr. Secretary—and I say for the benefit of the members of the 
committee who came in late, the committee adopted for this particular 
meeting a rule so as to give every member an early chance to ask a 
question, that each member would be given one question until we make 
the round and then we will go back to the 5-minute rule. 


51377—60 


2 



6 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

So, Mr. Secretary, in making the inquiry that I have in mind, I 
would like to ask you whether or not House Joint Resolution 567, if 
adopted, will speed up the program of the transfer which you have 
referred to in your statement. 

Secretary Brucker. In my opinion it would resolve the issue so it 
would set at rest the minds and the doubts that occurred with refer¬ 
ence to individuals. As to the agreement itself, postulated upon the 
action by Congress, that is set for July 1 and you will not lose a day 
or gain a day other than as I say, the psychological effect of settling 
and putting to rest once and for all the attitude of the Congress on it. 

We have agreed, based upon the Presidential arrangement and upon 
the basis of the disposition of Saturn—in the meantime it has been 
transferred to NASA—and other efforts which could be done admin¬ 
istratively by the Department of Defense and by NASA—we have 
agreed to do everything we can to go forward with this project and 
to not preclude a day’s delay to occur. I mean by that, anything of a 
financial nature, utilities, or the division itself. 

Answering directly your question it would set at rest in everybody’s 
mind the attitude of the Congress on it and that would be conclusive 
because when Congress expresses it, that is final. 

But in the meantime we are going right ahead each of us upon the 
premise that July 1 will be the date of the actual physical transfer 
but in the meantime the functional affair has been arranged so that 
it is phasing in and the other is phasing out as orderly as we can do 
it and do it to the best interests of all concerned. 

The Chairman. Mr. McCormack? 

Mr. McCormack. No questions now. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fulton? 

Mr. Fulton. No questions now. 

The Chairman. Mr. Teague. 

Mr. Teague. Well, General, I will ask you a question: What is 
going on in the scientific end of a so-called limited war? WTiat is 
happening in your drone TY reconnaissance ? What is happening in 
digging a foxhole for a man ? What is happening in a uniform that 
bullets won’t penetrate and that kind of thing? What is happening 
in the Army in that field ? 

General Lemnitzer. There is a great deal happening in all fields 
pertaining to limited war, as there is in a good many other fields 
related to general war, and also in the cold war activities of the 
Army. 

For limited war types of equipment, we have extensive research 
and development programs. We have a great deal of new equipment 
which our research and development programs have developed and 
tested—equipment which is either in production, being placed into 
the hands of troops, or soon will be in production and placed in the 
hands of troops. We place great emphasis on this, Mr. Teague. 

Mr. Teague. What about food ? 

General Lemnitzer. Food is included. Practically every aspect of 
sustained fighting on land is under review or under study. 

Mr. Teague. I was just trying to give you a chance, General, to 
give a sales talk for the Army and I thought you would go into a 
little more detail. 

Secretary Brucker. He wants you to talk about modernization, I 
can see that. 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 7 


Mr. McCormack. Where does the money go ? 

General Lemnitzer. You asked a general question. I have a gen¬ 
eral answer. If you want specifics, I will be glad to go into it. ■ 

It involves practically every type of equipment the Army uses and a 
lot of new types which are not now in production. 

Mr. Teague. I realize it does and very truthfully and frankly, I 
was giving you a chance to tell us how much you are doing and how 
important it is that you do it in this field, because I think you will 
certainly have more limited wars and I think the work you are doing 
is very important. 

General Lemnitzer. We think so, too. 

Mr. Teague. There is a lot more excitement in talking about space 
and hitting the moon than it is developing uniforms to protect a man 
and that kind of thing. 

General Lemnitzer. If you will give me the opportunity, I would 
like to preface my remarks by saying this: In the Army’s efforts to 
focus attention on limited war, the mistaken opinion has unfortunately 
been formed in a good many places that the Army’s only role is in 
the field of limited war. 

I consider, very strongly contend that the Army’s role in 
general, or world-type war, is undiminished. As a matter of 
fact, a good case can be made for an increasing role in general 
war. Skipping limited war for a moment, the Army also plays 
a vital role in cold war. Our deployed forces overseas—40 per¬ 
cent of the Army’s total strength right now is overseas. Those 
forces in my opinion, play a very vital role in the cold war. 

Now, limited war obviously involves primarily the Army, but 
it also involves, our sister services. This is, we consider, the most 
likely type of war. History has proven it since World War II, 
and we feel that the capabilities in the big missile field or the 
nuclear field are such that, as they become more and more equal— 
and I have referred to this many times in my statements before 
the congressional committees—we could well reach a state of nu¬ 
clear deterrence. 

I don’t for a minute believe that the objectives—the frequently 
announced objectives—of the Communists have been changed in 
the slightest; they will resort to smaller type military aggressions 
in order to attain those objectives. 

The Army is working hard on a modernization program. This 
is one of our key programs. We need to get equipped with the 
new types of equipment that are being developed by our research 
and development program, as I have indicated previously. For 
example, there is the new M-14 rifle which has but recently gone 
into production and with which we expect to equip the Army at 
the fastest possible rate. 

We have a new machinegun, the M-60, that will replace our pres¬ 
ent automatic weapons. Both of these weapons, the M-14 rifle and 
the M-60 machinegun, use the 7.62-mm., or the caliber .30, ammuni¬ 
tion. It is referred to as a NATO round; it is the new NATO 
round. It is still the same caliber as previous U.S. rifles and machine- 
guns but it is somewhat shorter in length. 

We also include the field artillery in our modernization program. 
We are now moving into the field of self-propelled artillery, rather 




8 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

than the types of towed artillery that we used during World W ar 
II and the Korean war. 

The most dramatic change in the Army’s firepower weapons 
is, of course, in the new missiles which we have. And incidentally, 
in the development of these new missiles, the Yon Braun team 
has played a very important role. 

The Army as far back as 1945 foresaw the developments which 
were occurring in the field of missiles, and it was with this in 
mind that the Army opened the way for the Yon Braun group to 
come to the United States to work for the Army and to develop 
these new missiles. 

Mr. Teague. Could you have put a satellite into orbit before the 
Russians if you had authority to do so ? 

General Lemnitzer. Well, this opens up an entirely new field 
of questions here, Mr. Teague. 

If I could go ahead with my other one. 

Mr. Teague. I was out of order, so pass it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Chenoweth. 

Mr. Chenoweth. Mr. Secretary, I am personally very happy as 
always, to see you and the general here. 

You can’t make your transition until July 1. In the meantime 
what will the so-called Yon Braun team be doing, will it be continuing 
its present activity—there will be no cessation of effort in this field ? 
I just wanted to make sure what their role was going to be during 
this interim. 

Secretary Brucker. Congressman Chenoweth, I am glad to clear 
that up if I can. That team has been working right along, day by 
day and night by night, exactly the same, under Army auspices all 
during the period since the time this direction was given. 

In other words, on the Saturn and all these other projects, it has 
been working on, there has been no change. It has been working right 
along under the auspices of the Army. 

NASA in the meantime has been increasingly interested. They 
have had nucleus teams down there and we are closely working with 
them. We have seen the work that has been done and are prepared 
to get into it. 

The Yon Braun team has been moving ahead on the Saturn. As 
a matter of fact, I was down there last Friday and Saturday myself, 
and have seen the progress. I have, of course, kept in touch with it 
right along, being very much interested in it. So that there will not 
be a day or an hour lost as far as the team is concerned, and the work. 

Over the door will be a change of management. It will say “Na¬ 
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration,” instead of “ABMA, of 
the U.S. Army.” But other than that, as far as the team players and 
the team members and the supervision of the work and all the rest is 
concerned, it is moving right along and the only thing that will 
physically occur on July 1 is that some people will move into some 
offices and some others will move out and there will be a physical 
change on that staff level. 

But as to the work level, the men who are right at it now, they will 
be right at the same place they were. There will be no change in 
factory or laboratory o,r anything else, insofar as the place where 
they work is concerned. The missile is right there. The Jupiters 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 9 

that will be a part of the cluster are being moved in and will continue 
to be moved in, so the difference that I describe here is more a differ¬ 
ence in the naming of the agency and the takeover of the new agency, 
rather than any startling change of any kind. 

The Chairman. I promised the press that we would suspend 
operations for some pictures at this time. 

So if there is no objection, we will recess. 

Is the press ready to take the pictures ? 

W e will recess for 5 minutes. 

(Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., a short recess was taken.) 

The Chairman. I will recognize Mr. McDonough, 

Mr. McDonough. Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you here and 
we are glad to know this coordination of the two departments is com¬ 
ing along in good fashion. 

The pertinent thing I am concerned about is, in your opinion with 
this consolidation, Do you think we can speed up our activity in the 
missile production and in space exploration ? 

Secretary Brucker. In answer to your question, sir, I can say this: 
It has been my experience over several years with the Von Braun 
team, with General Medaris in charge, and knowing as I do many 
members of that team and having seen it over several years, that they 
will give to you and the country as much acceleration as any team in 
the free world could do, or in the world for that matter. They are 
anxious, ready, willing, able, and, as you know, experienced, and you 
can trust them and I am sure they are dedicated. 

Further than that, I can’t go, except to say that I have great confi¬ 
dence in whatever they get by way of money that they will use it prop¬ 
erly and speedily and put it right to the best use. 

Mr. McDonough. In this present-day discussion about our lag in 
the production of missiles for defense against the Soviet Union, do 
you think it is possible with the handicaps we operate under, that we 
can match their production and come up to them or are we behind 
diem at the present time, in your opinion ? 

Secretary Brucker. I certainly feel that there are no handicaps 
that a democracy can’t overcome and succeed. I am positive, speaking 
concretely and directly to the point of this organization and their part 
in it. They have demonstrated from the time they developed the first 
Bedstone missile, all through the gamut of all the other missiles that 
the Army has had—ground to ground, surface to surface—including, 
of course, the Jupiter, the Jupiter-C that put the first satellite up 
just 2 years and 3 days ago, that this team is able to do it and is able 
to press forward as rapidly as any group could. 

I don’t know what more I could say except to say that they will, if 
given the opportunity and the backing—and by that I mean the 
money—and encouragement and the supervision—and, of course, that 
is a very important part of it, because General Medaris and the Army 
group contributed quite a little of what you might call the veast, or 
the cement that did a lot for that organization, that with all that, there 
is no doubt about the fact that, with the energy that they have and the 
knowledge, they are the match and I think the superior to their 
counterparts in the Soviet Union, in the long run. 

Mr. Anfuso. First of all, Mr. Secretary, I wish to congratulate 
you for giving to the country the Yon Braun team and for your 


10 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

great democratic statement that there is no handicap a democracy can’t 
meet. And certainly freedom of the press is no handicap. Because, 
as a matter of fact, if this country had been fully alerted and had 
made an all-out effort as most of the newspapers had urged right 
after the first sputnik, we would today have more ICBM’s in produc¬ 
tion, isn’t that the fact ? 

Secretary Brucker. There is no doubting the fact that if you ener¬ 
getically get busy with a good team and have things so coordinated 
and supervised, that you can produce more rapidly than you can if 
you don’t. 

At Redstone Arsenal, I want to say to you, you will remember it 
was about November 12, 1957, when Secretary McElroy gave me the 
green light and said, “All right, you fellows have been talking about 
it, go ahead and see what you can do.” 

And 84 days from that day, Jupiter-C was launched from the pad 
at Cape Canaveral, and the first free world satellite was placed in 
orbit. That is all I can say in reply to that. 

The Chairman. Mr. Bass. 

Mr. Bass. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement you stated that 
you have no objection to this proposed transfer of the Yon Braun 
team to NASA? 

Secretary Brucker. That is right. 

Mr. Bass. Stating it a little more positively, do I understand you 
are appearing here in favor of the proposed transfer ? 

Secretary Brucker. The reason that the Army has used this lan¬ 
guage is this: We have never been a special pleader that the ABMA 
be taken and turned over to any agency of any kind. However, 
when the decision was made, we not only issued a statement of com¬ 
plete cooperation, but we said we would go to work to implement it. 

As a matter of fact, the chairman was so interested in the space 
angle on this that he called me long distance, as he will remember. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Secretary Brucker. And asked me the question promptly, and I 
replied to him just as I have today here, that while the Army didn’t 
see eye to eye with that and we were urging that the Army continue 
it and go on doing it, but when the facts had all been heard and we 
had our opportunity to speak on it and everybody had considered it 
we were told that the consensus of the Government and the highest 
authority in the Government that had heard it finally had spoken. 
We said we would go to work on this and give it every bit of coopera¬ 
tion, so we won’t lose a man—and I give you my word that we did that, 
and that not one, from Dr. von Braun on down, has been made to 
understand that they would slip out, or that they were not encouraged 
to stay. 

We have not only done that, but we have gone the limit to turn 
over all the information and do every other thing—I won’t identify 
them—so that we would completely assist in this. 

The only reason the Army uses this, so that nobody will misunder¬ 
stand us, we are not trying to preempt the function of this committee, 
but as I have said here, it would set at rest, if this resolution were 
adopted, it would set minds at rest. We feel that we shouldn’t come 
in at this date and say, “Well, this is our solution to the problem” 
because it wasn’t originally, and we don’t want to take any of the 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 11 

credit that doesn't belong to us. We do say that we have cooperated 
and if it is your pleasure to do it, we certainly interpose no objection 
to it; as a matter of fact, we will cooperate and continue to cooperate 
with it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sisk. 

Mr. Sisk. Mr. Secretary, either you or General Lemnitzer may want 
to answer this. The question is this: Do you feel that the proposed 
transfer will in any way reduce the capability of the Army to fulfill 
its total mission ? 

Secretary Brucker. I would like to answer that myself and then 
if General Lemnitzer would like to add something, he is perfectly 
free to do it anyway, of course. 

We have taken that into consideration throughout the period of the 
time leading up to the decision in October 1959, and also since that 
time. We have been back and forth over it. 

The Yon Braun team, being very knowledgeable about our work— 
I mean our missile work, for instance—is going to be right there, 
right where our own Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency, Red¬ 
stone, is located. They are very familiar with it, and in the agreement 
that we have made we have very carefully set it out that they will be 
able to devote to the Army business—I mean by that the missile 
business—such time and effort and talent as is necessary right there 
at that location where we need it. If this was going to be moved to 
some other place, or that team was going to be truncated vertically or 
horizontally or something of that kind, then certainly I would have 
felt differently about it. However, to have the whole team there and 
altogether working primarily on space and the big Saturn which we all 
need very badly—and I just underscore that because it is a great proj¬ 
ect for space; it is the basic one in my opinion—but at the same time, 
have this knowledge and can devote attention and the counsel that are 
necessary to our people, who will be right at the same location. They 
will be right handy by there where they can step over and see our 
mockups and where they can step over to the test stand and see how 
that operates and all the rest. I don’t think that Dr. von Braun and 
the rest of these men on that team will lose their interest in the missiles. 

So from that standpoint, I can answer with a clear conscience that 
X think we will be able to go forward with our missiles under this 
arrangement. 

The Chairman. Mr. Riehlman. 

Mr. Sisk. Would General Lemnitzer comment ? 

The Chairman. The same question though. 

Mr. Sisk. No, no new question, but I would like to have the general 
answer it because he is responsible for the total mission of the Army 
and he knows what that mission is and I would like to hear any 
comments that he has. 

The Chairman. All right, General. 

General Lemnitzer. I would like to say that the Secretary is 
responsible for the total mission of the Army. I am merely the 
Chief of Staff. 

I agree with what the Secretary has said. Our concern initially 
was primarily in retaining the Yon Braun group as a national asset 
and insuring that nothing be done that would break up this important 
team, because it has been put together over a period of nearly 15 years. 


12 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

This is the period of time that the Army has been working with Dr. 
von Braun and his group in putting this great team together. 

We, of course, are particularly interested in having access to this 
team to assist us in any way that we feel we may need assistance from 
them in going on into our future missile programs. This we think is 
very important. We see nothing in the agreement that we have 
worked out with NASA that will preclude our doing so. As a matter 
of fact, I feel that the other services may also have access to the Von 
Braun team for such assistance as the team may be able to give 
without interfering with their primary NASA responsibilities. 

Mr. Sisk. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to indicate that I was 
downgrading the Secretary. I wanted the comment of a man in 
uniform. I differentiate between the civilian approach and the mil¬ 
itary approach. 

The Chairman. Mr. Riehlman. 

Mr. Riehlman. Mr. Secretary, you have given a great deal of credit 
to General Medaris and Dr. von Braun and their team for what 
they have done in this missile field. 

Do you feel that the suggestion of the transfer from the Army to 
NASA of that team had any effect upon General Medaris’ decision 
to retire from the Army ? 

Secretary Brucker. Well, of course, General Medaris is the best 
authority on General Medaris, but I would like to say to you that 
I immediately asked him that question. 

As a matter of fact I was very much interested in the attitude of 
both Dr. von Braun and General Medaris because anything that 
would in the slightest degree break up this team—and either one 
of those men, if they felt edgewise about it, would be of that nature— 
that it would be tragic, so I took it up with them individually. 

Answering your question precisely with regard to General Medaris, 
I do not believe, from what General Medaris has said or anything 
that I have seen about him since, that that was the cause of his retire¬ 
ment. While he has reservations or had reservations about the way 
in which the overall program in the long range should be conducted, 
he concurred in the action of General Lemnitzer and myself in 
cooperating with the NASA, in bringing about this relationship that 
I speak about today. And as for Dr. von Braun, I observed him over 
a period of more than a month in connection with the negotiations and 
the discussion that preceded this matter going to the top levels. I 
talked with him alone. I wanted to make sure that I talked to him 
with nobody else present. I also brought him to Washington another 
time for the purpose of discussing the matter with Dr. York who sits 
here and who was interested in talking with him personally and alone. 
I made him available to Dr. York to go down to his office. I think 
he was there for 2 or 3 hours alone. 

I also made him available to Dr. Keith Glennan so it eould not at 
any time be said that the Army was in any way keeping Dr. von 
Braun from having the information, or giving the information to 
others, or anybody that he wanted to talk to alone. 

I talked to him after all of these things and Dr. von Braun 
expressed to me at the time not only a willingness, but finally a desire, 
because of his great interest in the Saturn project, to see that the 
transfer occurred. He was very strong in his assurances that his 



TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 13 

entire team could stay together if it could work on the Saturn and 
inasmuch as Saturn was not to be canceled, but was to be transferred 
to NASA, it became his strong interest to see that his team worked 
under those circumstances under an arrangement of this kind. 

The Chairman. Mr. Karth. 

Mr. Karth. I pass at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hechler. 

Mr. Hechler. I was attracted, Mr. Secretary 7 , to this resolution and 
supported it immediately because of its first sentence which reads— 

To effect immediately the transfer of the Development Operations Division of 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. * * * 

In other words, it is written in the crystal clarity characteristic of 
its author, our colleague, Mr. Sisk, and I thought the third word 
there was one that really expressed the urgency of the committee, 
which I am sure that you and your associates share in our desire to 
move forward. 

Now, after your testimony, I note the reasons that you gave on 
page 2 of your statement for selecting the 1st of July 1960 as the 
effective date of transition. You refer to budget transition, and 
General Lemnitzer, on the first page of his statement, refers to this 
date because of the scope of the problem and the extent of adminis¬ 
trative work involved. 

It just occurred to me that perhaps if you had said something about 
national security I would have felt a little better but when you 
mention budget and administrative work we wonder whether this 
is really the kind of thing that deserves delay until the 1st of July, 
which appears to be taking place. 

Secretary Brucker. Let me state to you this: First of all, with 
reference to our statement here, we said in here— 

If it is not intended to interfere by forced acceleration with the orderly 
transition planned for July 1. 

I can say to you that the purpose that we had was to fix a date 
where an orderly, phased transition could occur. We could see that 
the problems are insurmountable down there, almost. They won’t 
all be surmounted by July 1 by any manner of means. It is a huge 
job, and it is a great work that they are doing. 

To endeavor to press too fast in the transfer would in my opinion— 
and we will do whatever you say—it would delay some of the efforts 
that might occur there. In other words, people who are expected to 
work right along on their work as such—I)r. von Braun and a host of 
others—that if it all occurs quickly and in a sort of spontaneous or 
quick manner, it would not be the orderly way in which people have 
to think through each problem, day by day. 

Now, you will ask, well in the meantime what is happening ? 

In the meantime they are anticipating the date of July 1 for the 
physical turnover. But to all intents and purposes, as far as the 
mental attitude toward it is concerned, the only thing that is left is 
the approval by Congress or the permission to let it go as it is beyond 
March 1 without anything which makes it automatic, and they are all 
geared up for July 1 I think at the present time. Everybody there 
fs, and I don’t think that any forced acceleration would help the 


51377—60 


3 



14 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

national security, or the program. On the contrary it might do it a 
great disservice. 

General Lemnitzer. I might add something to that. We have some 
recent experiences in this regard in working closely with NASA. A 
little over a year ago, we entered into a cooperative agreement with 
NASA to turn over the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena, 
Calif. It was an Army installation very much along the same line 
as ABMA—there are, of course, quite a few differences—but the 
transfer of that facility was handled in precisely this same way as 
we are arranging to transfer ABMA. We think this is the smoothest, 
most effective, and most efficient way of handling this kind of trans¬ 
fer. Our transfer of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California 
worked out very satisfactorily with NASA. It was done very effec¬ 
tively, and the pattern which is being followed in the transfer of 
ABMA closely follows that experience that we had about a year ago. 

The Chairman. Mr. Daddario ? 

Mr. Daddario. It was your great concern in this transfer that the 
personalities involved not be affected, that there be no differences 
even as to degree. You stress the importance of the location of the 
Yon Braun team and its being able to be near you at Huntsville; that 
these people can just walk over and see your mockups; that there be 
cooperation continued in the future insofar as your rockets and 
missiles are concerned. 

And as you have set it out, I wonder if we are not making—if there 
is not the possibility of making the mistake in separating these at 
all, that maybe this whole business ought to be put together. There 
seems to be in the background of what you say that there is such a 
cohesion necessary between the developments of rockets and mis¬ 
siles and space, that it ought to be all in one package. 

Now, should it be? 

Mr. Brucker. The degree of effort that is put back of it is just as 
I have said before, it is all a part of the same package. But in October 
the die was cast, to be plain about it. Many events have occurred in 
the meantime: Administrative acts which were in the power of the 
administrative branch of the Government to do; the making of the 
budgets; the transfer of Saturn to NASA; so many, many things of 
that nature have occurred that to unscramble them and go back 
again would be almost destructive. I say that, not because, in any 
sense, the Army doesn’t and didn’t want to retain the Yon Braun 
team, but because we think that now that the transfer has gone this 
far that it would be like unscrambling something to start back again. 
The arguments we made originally in support of retaining the team 
are no different from what they were in October 1959, but all of 
these things have occurred since that time, in anticipation, of course, 
of the transfer taking place. To say nothing, of course, of the Presi¬ 
dential directive. 

The Chairman. Mr. Moeller ? 

Mr. Moeller. I pass, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Quigley ? 

Mr. Quigley. Mr. Secretary, I have one question. No reflection 
intended upon my colleague from California, or the purpose or objec¬ 
tive behind his resolution, which I favor, I think, if I understand the 
objective. It is to indicate that Congress, or this committee approves 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 15 

this idea and we would like to see it done as quickly as it is feasible and 
practical to do it. But being practical about it, will the action of 
Congress, the favorable action of this committee and the Congress 
on Mr. Sisk’s resolution, as a practical matter, will it make any 
difference with the implementation and the transfer ? 

Secretary Brucker. As a practical matter, the transfer would take 
place on July 1, 1960, with all arrangements made and phased to do 
it. Also as a practical matter—and this is not just an intangible— 
Congress’ action on this matter would settle it in the minds of Dr. von 
Braun, to go back to work without a thought as to whether or not 
there would be a changeback. All of his organization feels the same. 
Hundreds of people down there are concerned, all the workmen and 
the rest—you know how it is with people who here rumors and specu¬ 
lation—maybe the Congress will do this or maybe they will do that. 
That would settle that once and for all, and everybody would settle 
down and go to work. 

Mr. Quigley. In other words, you would stop waiting for the other 
shoe to fall. 

Secretary Brucker. That is a good way to put it. 

Mr. Quigley. The minute you stop it will drop. 

The Chairman. We have here this afternoon, too, the Under 
Secretary of the Army, Mr. Milton. 

Do you have a statement concerning the resolution ? 

Mr. Milton. I do not, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Anfuso. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev said that he built 
250 ICBM’s in 1959. Assuming that statement is true he would 
have by the end of 1962, at least a thousand ICBM’s, isn’t that 
correct ? 

Secretary Brucker. Arithmetically, that is. 

The Chairman. Now, may I ask you one more queston, too, 
Mr. Secretary. 

Could you tell the committee now under this new operation, what 
part of space, of the space program, if any, does the Army retain, 
and what is the future of the Army in space? We are very much 
interested in that. I think the Army has a place in space as well 
as the other agencies. 

Secretary Brucker. General Lemnitzer would like to answer that 
for you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Lemnitzer. We feel that there are great military pos¬ 
sibilities in space; that we have only scratched the surface in space 
to date. I don’t think it is clear to anyone just what the future 
military interests in space are. However, I don’t think there can 
be any question whatsoever but that there are tremendous mili¬ 
tary possibilities in space, even though we don’t comprehend them 
in their entirety, at this time. 

In accordance with the decision made by the Secretary of Defense, 
the assigned roles and missions in space have been broken down into 
certain definite categories. The Department of the Air Force has 
been given the responsibility for the development of large type 
boosters to be used for military projects in space. 

The responsibility for developing reconnaissance satellites has 
also been given to the Air Force. The development of satellites 
to be used for navigation has been given to the Department of the 



16 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

Navy. The Army’s assigned function in this regard is in the field 
of communications satellites. 

The Chairman. Well, we certainly thank you, General, and we 
thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. McCormack? 

Mr. McCormack. I passed on one question. Are we going to 
have some more? 

The Chairman. Surely. 

Mr. McCormack. I have a list of questions here, Mr. Secretary. 
I will give them to you and I would like to get the answers to them. 

There are quite a few questions there. You may put the answers 
in the record. 

Secretary Brucker. Very well, we will. 

(The information requested is classified.) 

Mr. McCormack. Do you recall H.R. 9675, a bill to amend the 
organic act establishing NASA ? 

Secretary Brucker. I know about it generally, but I am not ac¬ 
quainted with the particular bill itself here. 

Mr. McCormack. When was the Army first acquainted with the 
fact that these changes were proposed ? 

Secretary Brucker. The changes with respect to the transfer of- 

Mr. McCormack. No, not the transfer. I know you are unhappy 
about it but you are accepting it. I got that all right. I think 
you take something as an accomplished fact, which is pretty much 
commonsense and we all hope they will go ahead and work in close 
cooperation with the military because we can’t forget the fact that 
the very preservation of the world might be involved. We had better 
put more emphasis on the military—we had better not deempliasize 
the military in importance in the world today. 

But these are amendments to the organic act. 

Secretary Brucker. Mr. McCormack, I regret to say that we know 
about this generally but it has never been referred to us for comment 
and so I am unable to comment upon this H.R. 9675. 

Mr. McCormack. You were not consulted before these changes 
were drafted ? 

Secretary Brucker. No, I am quite sure that is the fact about it. 
The Army has not had the opportunity to staff it. I would answer 
if I had the opportunity myself, in addition, but I have not had it. 

Mr. McCormack. I call your attention to section 309, page ff. I 
asked Dr. Dryden and Mr. Horner some questions the other day and 
they were perfectly frank in saying that if any amendments were 
necessary to clarify the position of the military, to protect the 
jurisdiction of the military in research and so forth, that would be 
agreeable to them. 

But I call your attention to that language. I am not going to ask 
you to answer it now because you haven’t had a chance to look into 
it but I suggest the Department of the Army look into this, into 
these proposed changes and be prepared to submit to the committee 
the views of the Army. 

I would also like the same of the Navy. 

The Air Force apparently was consulted, to some extent, and 
they are in pretty much agreement with the language although they 



TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 17 

have some suggestions to make, which would be very interesting to 
me, and I am sure the other members of the committee. 

You don't believe, of course, that research could be confined to 
one agency—that is the space agency—where it involves the military, 
do you? 

Secretary Brucker. We have always felt that the research and 
development in the military field should be in the military research 
and development field. 

Mr. McCormack. You know of course we tried to protect you 
last year in the original act and we found by interpretation of the 
executive branch that they brought about a somewhat different 
interpretation than the committee intended on the word “except.” 

You are aware of that, aren’t you ? 

Secretary Brucker. I remember that. 

Mr. McCormack. I often wondered who agreed in the Defense 
Department to that interpretation but I won’t press it; but there was 
a somewhat different interpretation placed on that word, that I know, 
than I intended. I was chairman of the committee and I am sure that 
the full committee didn’t intend that. Never did we fail to recognize 
the importance of the military in the world of today and in the fore¬ 
seeable future. 

Now, I would like to have you, without asking you questions, 
I would like to have you and your associates look these amendments 
over. Look them over from the angle of seeing that the Defense 
Department, what their position may be in connection with pre¬ 
serving jurisdiction, that in the field of not only development and 
appliances and research that may be important to the very pres¬ 
ervation of our country. 

Secretary Brucker. Thank you very much. We will do that. 

Mr. McCormack, Dr. York has just indicated to me here that 
the Army Research and Development Director and the Chief of 
Research Development did confer on this. 

Mr. McCormack. I would even look into that a little further 
and see when they were consulted—whether it was after the bill 
was introduced or somewhere around the time, and so forth. You 
better look into that a little. I know Dr. York was probably con¬ 
sulted and the Air Force was consulted but I am talking about the 
Army and the Navy. 

Secretary Brucker. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McCormack. I want to get their views, also. 

Secretary Brucker. I am just relaying what Dr. York said to me. 

The Chairman. We would like to have the official Army views on 
that bill. 

Mr. McCormack. A lot of us still realize that there is an Army 
and a Navy. 

Mr. Anfuso. I do. 

Mr. McCormack. Yes. I said a lot of us do. 

Mr. Fulton. And the Air Force, too. 

Mr. McCormack. I said there is still an Army and Navy. 

The Chairman. And a great Army and Navy. 

Secretary Brucker. If I make any comment, somebody will talk 
about interservice rivalry. 

Thank you very much. 


18 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

Mr. Fulton. The question comes up on the development of the 
Army of its equipment on the ground cushion principle. That is 
dispensing with wheels, tank treads, and moving into vertical takeoff 
vehicles; tanks that move on air and go over fences and rivers without 
getting mired. 

Could you comment about some of those developments that the 
Army is now moving ahead with in that field ? I think it is a tremen¬ 
dously important field, and it is space. 

General Lemnitzer. I would be glad to comment on it, Mr. F ulton. 

We regard mobility as one of our key requirements and it will be 
more so as the techniques of war develop in the future. 

In the case of air mobility you can avoid such obstacles on land as 
rivers, rugged areas of terrain, mountains—and you don’t have to give 
them the same degree of attention that we have always had to give 
them in the pagt. 

In this field we have a new family of fixed wing aircraft and heli¬ 
copters coming along and we are presently working on an aircraft that 
will give us true vertical takeoff and landing. I think the advantage 
of these developments is pretty obvious. You don’t need air strips— 
improved air strips—and you can avoid the requirement of building 
roads in order to maintain the support of the combat forces. 

Most important of all, you can move troops quickly and put them 
in position where they can do the job that you are attempting to have 
them do. So, air mobility is one of the key features of our modern¬ 
ization program. We have a good many interesting developments 
coming along in this field. We are devoting a considerable amount 
of our procurement budget to getting this equipment into the hands 
of troops as fast as possible. 

In the case of land mobility, we have the same interest because there 
are heavy weights to be transported; for example, ammunition. We 
have to have vehicles that afford protection against bullets, shell frag¬ 
ments, and radiation. So, we have now under production one of our 
newest personnel carriers that we are particularly proud of, that can 
move rapidly off roads. It is the M-113. This personnel carrier 
employs aluminum armor for the first time. 

We are also interested in making all of these vehicles amphibious 
so that we don’t have to stop and build bridges across a stream in the 
face of enemy fire. We want to be able to move right on without 
any delay when we reach rivers. This is extremely important. In 
summary, a considerable amount of our research and development 
program and a great deal of our procurement program are now de¬ 
voted to procuring the latest types of vehicles, air and ground, that 
will give us this mobility which we need. 

Mr. Fulton. Do you have a target date for the tanks that will use 
the ground cushion effect and ride on air rather than treads ? 

General Lemnitzer. I think that would be pretty far in the future 
because of the very heavy weights we are talking about. We do, 
however, have study projects that are looking into zero ground pres¬ 
sure vehicles using that principle. 

The Chairman. Thank you, General and Mr. Secretary. 

Now, it is 3 :15. We have several witnesses standing by to follow 
up here, on the Sisk resolution. 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 19 

It is my thought if we are going to reach them in this afternoon 
and take any action on the resolution that we will have to confine our 
questions to the resolution itself. 

Mr. Secretary, we are certainly grateful to you and to the General 
and Under Secretary Milton for coming here and assisting the com¬ 
mittee. 

As Mr. McCormack has previously said, we will be very much in¬ 
terested in the official position of the Army with reference to these 
changes in the basic NASA law. 

Mr. McCormack. Mr. Chairman, might I make the observation: 
Two of our colleagues on the committee paid their respects to Secre¬ 
tary Brucker—and not to flatter him—but before I met the Secretary 
and after he was appointed I was in Boston. Mrs. McCormack and 
I were talking and watching television and we heard you the first time 
you were on the air after you were nominated, and at that time we sat 
and chatted and evaluated you, and we both agreed that you are a 
very substantial-looking gentleman. 

Mr. Sisk. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the resolution, the intent 
was to do exactly what you have indicated here is your desire, and I 
simply have one question with reference to the resolution itself, on 
page 2, is that the President’s transfer plan transmitted with a report 
of January 14, 1960, shall take effect immediately. In other words, 
the plan ? 

Secretary Brucker. That is right. 

Mr. Sisk. And therefore I agree completely with you, for in no 
sense did I intend for this to interfere with the orderly procedure 
of taking over. And with the language here, do you recommend any 
amendment to that language or do you feel that that is clear ? 

Secretary Brucker. I think that makes it clear. 

Mr. Sisk. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming here. 

Mr. Fulton. Before they leave, a matter of technical procedure. 

The Chairman. A point of order. Mr. F ulton is recognized. 

Mr. Fulton. There has been filed House Concurrent Resolution 559 
by Mr. Stratton, that Congress not favor the transfer plan making 
certain transfers from the Department of Defense to NASA. I be¬ 
lieve that is a matter of procedure, and I would ask the advice of the 
majority leader. Should we not likewise have that before us as well as 
the Sisk resolution ? 

The Chairman. It is before every member. I think every mem¬ 
ber here has been given a copy. 

Mr. McCormack. When you come to vote on the Sisk resolution, 
we don’t have to take any action on that if we don’t want to. 

The Chairman. That disposes of it. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. Now, we have Dr. York, and 
then we have Mr. Albert Siepert. Dr. York, the committee lias had 
the pleasure of having you with us before this year. We want to 
address ourselves this afternoon especially to House Joint Resolution 
567 by Mr. Sisk, which will speed up the transfer of the Development 
Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency from the 
Arm} 7 to NASA. 

Do you have a prepared statement ? 


20 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

STATEMENT OF DR. HERBERT F. YORK, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. York. I have no prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Give us your ideas regarding it. 

Dr. York. I can give them very briefly. I support this resolution 
and, as the Secretary of the Army has said, it would be very helpful 
to clear the air. 

Likewise, as he said for administrative, budgetary, and other pur¬ 
poses, the formal transfer probably is best deferred until the end of 
the fiscal year. From all practical purposes from the point of view 
of the program, the transfer has been in effect for 3 or 4 months. 

The Chairman. Is that your statement, sir ? 

Dr. York. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Siepert has a prepared statement. Is it 
with respect to this resolution or is it just a general statement ? 

Dr. York. He is from NASA and I cannot speak for him. 

The Chairman. At any rate you support the resolution as is ? 

Dr. York. I support it in the same way Mr. Brucker supported it; 
namely, it is a fine idea to clear the air and get rid of the 60-day 
waiting period, but that waiting until July 1 is probably necessary 
from an administrative and fiscal point of view. That is all. 

That is what I understood Mr. Sisk to say his bill was for—excuse 
me. 

Mr. McCormack. There will be close coordination to prevent dupli¬ 
cation and any unnecessary expenditures of the taxpayers’ money, 
in the military field where it is involved. 

Dr. York. There will be every attempt, yes, to achieve that. 

The Chairman. As a matter of practical arrangement unless this 
committee does take action, the committee is partially bypassed because 
you proceed to the Appropriations Committee with the idea of getting 
appropriations for the transfer. I think for several reasons it is 
important to take action timely on this resolution. 

Now, Mr. McCormack, do you have any questions ? 

Mr. McCormack. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fulton. 

Mr. Fulton. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Miller. I would just like to say something off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Mr. McDonough. 

Mr. McDonough. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Anfuso. 

Mr. Anfuso. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Chenoweth. 

Mr. Chenoweth. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sisk. 

Mr. Sisk. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Bass. 

Mr. Bass. No questions. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions here ? 



TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 21 

If not, Dr. York, we certainly appreciate your fine statement. 

At this time we will hear Mr. Richard Horner, Associate Director 
of NASA. Will you direct yourself, Mr. Horner, to this resolution 
at this time? 

STATEMENT 0E RICHARD HORNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. Horner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say also Mr. Siepert is 
with me. He is the Director of Business Administration of the 
N ASA. 

As a practical matter, it might be said that the transfer of the Yon 
Braun team from ABM A to NASA has been in process ever since the 
21st of October. Immediately after that date we commenced a study 
of the administrative arrangements that would be necessary to com¬ 
plete the transfer and Mr. Siepert was placed in charge of that study 
from the NASA side. 

He has a prepared statement which is comprehensive and in detail. 

With the chairman’s permission, I would suggest that the statement 
be placed in the record, and Mr. Siepert is prepared to summarize it 
in 5 or 10 minutes with the help of some charts that he has here. 

The Chairman. Mr. Siepert has been standing by for several days 
and we appreciate your patience, Mr. Siepert, for doing that. 

We will proceed upon the suggestion of the Associate Adminis¬ 
trator; that is, to place your statement as it is in the record and if 
then you w T ill elaborate on it, or brief it—however you desire to 
proceed—we will be glad to hear from you. 

STATEMENT 0E ALBERT E. SIEPERT, DIRECTOR, BUSINESS ADMIN¬ 
ISTRATION, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINIS¬ 
TRATION 

Mr. Siepert. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the plan 
transmitted to Congress by the President on January 14 relating to 
the transfer to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
of the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency and certain other Department of Defense functions. 

Immediately after the President’s decision was announced on Oc¬ 
tober 21, 1959, our Administrator, Dr. Glennan, designated me as 
NASA’s principal negotiator to arrange with the Army the details 
of the transfer. Since that time this has been essentially a full-time 
assignment in order to assure that the transfer of the Yon Braun 
group to the NASA is effected without disrupting the essential space 
and weapons projects now underway. NASA at this point is confi¬ 
dent that the plans are realistic and that, with the support of this 
committee and the Congress, the proposed transfer can be accom¬ 
plished in a manner which will greatly strengthen this Nation’s space 
efforts, both civilian and military. There are several aspects of the 
proposed plan which, I believe, will be of special significance to this 
committee. 


51377—60 


4 




22 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 


1. RELATIONSHIP OF TRANSFER TO THE NATIONAL SPACE EFFORT 

Under the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, NASA was 
established as a civilian agency to plan and conduct space explora¬ 
tion for peaceful purposes. This mandate is accompanied by an 
“except” clause which reserves to the Department of Defense: 

* * * activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of 
weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States. * * * 

This “except” clause has caused apparent misunderstanding among 
the public as to who is responsible for what in the space field. The 
intent of the law has been to give NASA, on the one hand, sole re¬ 
sponsibility for developing and carrying out the national space 
exploration program, in all its aspects. On the other hand, the 
Defense Department is responsible for defending the Nation in every 
medium or environment at its disposal—on land, on sea, in the air 
and in space. If the armed services fire a missile into space, it is 
for the development of a defense mission; it is not firing the shot as 
part of the national space exploration program. Such activities by 
Defense are governed strictly by their advancement of military ob¬ 
jectives. Understandably, of course, these Defense missions may 
advance the state of the space art. 

It was in this context that the President reviewed the requirements 
and current activities of the Department of Defense and NASA, and 
decided on October 21, 1959, to assign NASA sole responsibility for 
development of very high thrust vehicles required for space explora¬ 
tion. This decision was based on the consideration, concurred in by 
the Secretary of Defense, that presently there is no current clear- 
cut military requirement for these vehicles. On the other hand, 
future exploration of space, manned and unmanned, for scientific 
and peaceful purposes, can only be achieved through use of vehicles 
of very high thrust. 

In line with this assignment of responsibility, NASA and DOD 
worked out an agreement that NASA assume technical direction 
of the Saturn vehicle systems. As you have heard from Dr. von 
Braun, this is an interim management arrangement until the De¬ 
velopment Operations Division can be transferred to NASA in ac¬ 
cordance with the plan now before you. As you know, this project 
was initiated and funded by the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency of DOD; it was being carried forward by ABMA. 

The Saturn vehicle now constitutes a substantial and growing part 
of the Development Operations Division’s workload; the military 
or weapons systems assignments of this group are rapidly decreas¬ 
ing. Accordingly, the President has proposed that the unique ca¬ 
pabilities and interests of this division in space flight development 
should be transferred and made available to NASA. 

Needs may well develop in the future for the use of large launch 
vehicles for defense purposes. To prepare for this possibility, 
the President has instructed NASA to be responsive fully to spe¬ 
cific DOD requests in this area. Furthermore, NASA and DOD 
will continue with a coordinated program for development of space 
vehicles based on current IRBM and ICBM missiles and growth 
versions of those missiles. 



TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 23 


The background for these arrangements is covered in more detail 
in the memorandum to the President which Dr. Glennan and Sec¬ 
retary Gates jointly submitted on October 31,1959. 

In summary then, the decision of the President to assign to NASA 
sole responsibility for the development of space launch vehicles, 
and the corollary action to transfer the Development Operations 
Division to NASA serves to clarify the responsibility of NASA 
and to allocate to it certain available resources in a manner to 
facilitate NASA’s discharge of these responsibilities. 

2. DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF NASA’s SPACE CAPABILITIES 


The transfer of the Yon Braun group will give NASA a unique 
and demonstrated competence in space vehicle development. Where 
this capability fits into the NASA space picture can best be ex¬ 
plained by reviewing quickly the brief organizational history of 
NASA. 


NASA became officially operative on October 1, 1958. As you 
know, the new agency absorbed the 43-year-old National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, together with its aeronautical and space 
research missions. However, NASA’s overall mission is far broader 
than that of NACA, since it is empowered to direct all U.S. aero¬ 
nautical and space research and development, apart from military 
projects. 

In aeronautics, NASA limits itself to research and it cooperates 
closely with DOD in aerospace problems. 

Thus, NASA was provided an immediate competence in various 
fields of aeronautical and space research. 

While NACA’s laboratories initially had been developed to per¬ 
form work in the field of aeronautics, much basic research in the 
new fields of space was already underway. Research projects in¬ 
cluded studies relating to reentry, development and testing of sound¬ 
ing rockets, studies relating to aerodynamic characteristics of 
missiles, propulsion research, and similar fundamental work of im¬ 
portance in the space field. What was lacking, however, was adequate 
competence in the design, construction, and operation of space vehicles 
and in the related fields of advanced guidance and control, communica¬ 
tions, tracking, and data reduction. 

The need for expansion of the NASA capability in the space field 
was recognized by the Congress in the enactment of the Space Act 
of 1958. Under section 302 of this act, the President was empowered 
to— 


* * * transfer to the Administration any functions (including powers, duties, 
activities, facilities, and parts of functions) of any other department or agency 
of the United States, or of any officer or organizational entity thereof, which 
relate primarily to the functions, powers, and duties of the Administration as 
prescribed by section 203 of this Act. 

Acting under this authority, the President, on November 28, 1958, 
transferred to NASA personnel, equipment, and functions formerly 
assigned to the Navy’s Project Vanguard. In addition, certain 
personnel from the upper atmosphere group of the Naval Research 
Laboratory were also transferred to N A S A. From this group, NASA 
was fortunate in acquiring some 400 highly trained and experienced 


24 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

personnel in the field of space sciences and satellite applications, as 
well as tracking, communications, and data reduction. 

On December 3, 1958, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated 
under contract by the California Institute of Technology, was trans¬ 
ferred from the Department of the Army to NASA. JPL personnel, 
therefore, contribute to NASA a demonstrated ability in virtually all 
aspects of space science and technology with particular capacity in 
development of upper stages and guidance systems, and tracking 
for deep space probes. 

Neither the Vanguard or JPL groups, however, provided NASA 
with the necessary capability to develop big space vehicle systems. 
The Huntsville group clearly gives NASA a team of outstanding 
experts who are capable not only of “inhouse” research and develop¬ 
ment of large launch vehicles, but also of providing, as needed, the 
responsible technical monitoring and direction of the various in¬ 
dustrial contractors who assist in the engineering and production of 
such launch vehicles. 

3. IMPACT OF TRANSFER ON THE NASA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

The transfer of the Huntsville facility and its integration into 
NASA organizational structure has been helped considerably by some 
adjustments and redefinition of the previous mission assignments 
within NASA. Our headquarters organizational structure has al¬ 
ready been modified to permit improvement of NASA’s program 
development and execution. The headquarters organization of 
NASA now provides for four, rather than three, major operational 
elements. 

Instead of a single Office of Space Flight Development, in its place 
we have established two groups: 

(1) The Office of Space Flight Programs, under the leadership 
of Dr. Abe Silverstein, will be primarily responsible for the conduct 
of space exploration including manned space flight represented today 
by Project Mercury; the conduct of scientific investigations of space; 
the development of practical applications of space technology in¬ 
cluding communications and meterological satellite systems; and the 
development of necessary tracking, communications, and data reduc¬ 
tion systems. The Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and the Wallops (Va.) Station will report to this office. 

(2) The Office of Launch Vehicle Programs, under the leader¬ 
ship of Gen. Don R. Ostrander, will develop necessary launch 
vehicles including the conduct of their testing, modification, launching 
and initial guidance. The Huntsville facility, and the NASA launch 
activities at the cape and the Pacific Missile Range will report to this 
office. 

Besides these two new offices, our primary operating groups at the 
headquarters level include the Office of Advanced Research (formerly 
the Office of Aeronautical and Space Research which supervises the 
research centers) and the Office of Business Administration. The 
functions of these two groups remain unchanged. 

When the Huntsville facility is acquired, some gradual realine- 
ment of missions assigned to our field installations will begin. Bas¬ 
ically, these missions assignments are as follows: 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 25 

NASA Huntsville facility. —Research and development of large 
launch vehicle systems. This includes guidance development and 
necessary testing and modifications to assure reliable operation of 
such vehicles. This group will also be responsible for the launch of 
NASA space vehicles including performance evaluations of such 
launches. It will conduct, as assigned, research and development in 
such areas as advanced propulsion and guidance systems. 

Goddard Space Flight Center. —The conduct of earth satellite 
programs including scientific investigations, practical applications 
and manned flight. This center will be primarily responsible for 
all communications, tracking, and data reduction relating to satellite 
programs. In addition, the sounding rocket programs will be as¬ 
signed to this center. 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory under Cal Tech contract. —The develop¬ 
ment of lunar and deep space exploration programs. This respon¬ 
sibility will include development or necessary modification of terminal 
propulsion, midcourse and terminal guidance for such missions and 
operation of the deep space probe tracking network. 

The missions of Langley, Ames, Lewis, and Flight Research Centers 
remain basically unchanged, as does Wallops Station. Emphasis at 
all of our research centers will, however, be directed increasingly to¬ 
ward the conduct of research. 

NASA does not believe that it is either desirable or feasible to 
place our field centers in any “intellectual straight]*acket” which 
would foreclose the possibilities for their making research and devel¬ 
opment contributions in other areas than those within their primary 
field of assignment. 

On the other hand, the delineation of primary areas of emphasis 
helps to assure the necessary concentration and economy of effort we 
must achieve for our program as quickly as possible. 

4. BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE NASA-ARMY TRANSFER PLAN 

I have outlined the adjustments which we have already made in 
our organizational structure in order to take the fullest advantage of 
the competence of the transferred Huntsville group. The conditions 
of the transfer have been worked out in considerable detail and we 
will be glad to discuss these in whatever degree the committee wishes. 
The main principles are outlined in tw T o agreements signed by Dr. 
Glennan and Secretary Brucker. Copies of the initial agreements 
of November 16, 1959, and the summary of the more detailed plan of 
December 11 which NASA and Defense approved on December 16 
are here for the committee’s study and for insertion in these hearings 
if the committee so desires. 

I would like, however, to mention a few major points relating to the 
proposed transfer so that this committee may understand our basic 
thinking in this regard. 

(1) NASA has received full cooperation from the principal Army 
negotiator, General Schomburg, and all other AOMC and ABM A 
representatives in working out a number of potentially difficult prob¬ 
lems. Dr. von Braun, his deputy, Mr. Rees, and key members of his 
staff have worked closely with us in all phases of the negotiations. 


26 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

I believe tlie commiteee will find these men are generally satisfied with 
the results thus far reached in our agreements with the Army. 

(2) This transfer must be effected without disrupting ongoing 
programs of either NASA or the Army. Rather than make an abrupt 
shift from Army to NASA control, both parties are prepared to take 
more time to work out details thoroughly before making the official 
shift of personnel. 

(3) The formal transfer of the Von Braun team will take place on 
July 1, 1960, when the start of a new fiscal year makes it easiest to 
effect a changeover in the accounting and personnel systems. NASA, 
however, is assuming immediate technical control of the Saturn and 
will take over from ARPA all unobligated Saturn balances as soon 
as the President’s plan can take effect. A direct planning and tech¬ 
nical relationship now exists between NASA and the Von Braun 
group to assure proper integration of program development and op¬ 
eration in the NASA space area. 

(4) The President’s plan will transfer to NASA any supergrade 
or Public Law 313 positions now allotted to key members of the Von 
Braun group who transfer to NASA. Some 18 positions ranging 
from $15,375 to $19,000 are involved. NASA will be able to allocate 
to Huntsville an additional 21 NASA “excepted” positions under the 
authority of section 203b (2) of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Act. 

(5) NASA is arranging for Dr. von Braun’s group to complete, on 
a reimbursable basis, such work on weapons systems (Pershing, Ju¬ 
piter, etc.) as the Army may request. 

(6) To assure that Army is able to continue to carry out its re¬ 
sponsibilities, we have agreed that up to 350 civil service personnel 
from the Development Operations Division wifi be given an oppor¬ 
tunity to remain with the Army to assist in developing, managing 
or evaluating Army weapons projects. 

Dr. von Braun has agreed to this proposal and has indicated that 
this number can be made available in a manner which will not 
adversely affect the capability of his team to carry out the new space 
assignments with NASA. Replacements, by conversion of certain 
military specialists upon expiration of their enlistments and by hir¬ 
ing into civil service some outside personnel, will restore the team to 
its full present strength of 4,300 civilian employees. 

(7) The Army has indicated that there will be a continuing need 
for much of the present administrative support personnel at the 
Redstone Arsenal to carry out military programs assigned to that 
base. As the committee knows, the Development Operations Divi¬ 
sion is but one of several major operating units at the Arsenal. 

As a result, it would not be possible, without seriously curtailing 
other Army programs, to transfer all the administrative support per¬ 
sonnel which have contributed to the support of the Division in the 
past. The available personnel must be shared on an equitable basis. 

Between now and July 1, 1960, NASA will be building its own 
administrative organization, utilizing certain key Army personnel 
who will agree to transfer to us to assist in the planning and staffing. 
We are fully aware of certain problems posed in creating a separate 
support organization within a relatively few months. The complete 
staffing will require approximately 1,200 administrative and technical 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 27 

personnel to continue to meet the needs of the transferred Yon Braun 
group of 4,300. The Army has agreed that NASA may recruit by 
transfer up to 815 Army personnel in order to provide a firm base for 
the provision of these services. We are working closely with Army 
representatives to assure that by July 1, 1960, we will have recruited 
much of our required staff and be operational in most of the admin¬ 
istrative areas. By agreement with the Army, a few services may not 
be assumed by NASA until a later date, but in no case beyond Decem¬ 
ber 31, 1960. In the interim, the Army will continue to support the 
Yon Braun group as it has done in the past. 

(8) Adequate arrangements have been made to obtain the labora¬ 
tory facilities and equipment now used by the Yon Braun group. The 
Army is making available to NASA approximately 1,200 acres of land 
at Huntsville, and total facilities and equipment valued at about $100 
million, including $14 million at Cape Canaveral. 

(9) You may well ask what provisions have been made to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of facilities at the arsenal. I can assure you 
that neither NASA nor the Army is duplicating base facilities unnec¬ 
essarily. NASA will enter agreements with the Army for it to fur¬ 
nish NASA on a reimbursable basis all necessary steam, sewage 
disposal, water, fire protection, and other common services. 

(10) It seems clear that, in at least two areas, additional facilities 
must be constructed in order to accommodate both the Army and 
NASA organizations. Deficits in office space and in computation 
facilities have resulted in NASA’s agreeing to seek construction funds 
in the fiscal year 1961 budget for its own headquarters office structure 
and Army’s agreeing to provide its own separate computation 
laboratory. 

In conclusion, NASA strongly believes that the addition of the 
Huntsville group to NASA is essential to the national civilian space 
program. This group will provide NASA with an essential capa¬ 
bility not now available to it. The absorption of the Huntsville group 
by NASA has required reorganization of our headquarters office and 
a realinement of mission assignments to field centers. These tasks 
have already been accomplished. The transfer plan, developed in 
cooperation with the Army, should result in a transfer of these 
functions to NASA with no disruption to on-going programs. 

The transfer plan, under ordinary circumstances, would not become 
effective until 60 days after its submission to the Congress on January 
14 and then only if no adverse resolution has been passed by the Con¬ 
gress. The NASA has noted with appreciation Representative Sisk’s 
resolution, House Joint Resolution 567, to expedite favorable action on 
the transfer plan. Its adoption at an early date would be of great help 
in removing employment uncertainties for those now connected with 
the Development Operations Divisions or those whom NASA seeks to 
recruit among the administrative and plant support groups now 
attached to other elements in the Redstone Arsenal organizations. 

Thank you for your interest. I will be happy to answer any 
questions the committee may have concerning NASA’s interests in 
in this proposed transfer. 

Mr. Siepert. We thought it would be best if we used several charts 
to explain what is involved in the transfer of the functions, personnel 
and facilities that are necessary for Dr. von Braun to continue his 
work in space. 


28 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 


(The chart entitled “Steps Involved in Transfer of DOD to 
NASA” follows:) 

$m>$motm w tamper of mm mm 


• PRESIDENT'S DECISION - OCT 21, 1959 

• ARMY-NASA AGREEMENT - NOV. 16,1959 

• DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED TRANSFER PLAN 
BY ARMY-NASA TEAM-OCT THRU DEC, 1959 

• SUBMISSION OF PRESIDENT'S TRANSFER PLAN TO 
CONGRESS - JAN. 14,1960 

• DEVELOPMENT OF NASA ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 
AT HUNTSVILLE - FEB. TO JULY 1, 1960 

• TRANSFER OF DOD PERSONNEL TO NASA- 
JULY 1, 1960 

Mr. Siepert. This chart indicates the planning steps which have 
followed the President’s decision of October 21, 1959. I would like 
to put in the record two supporting documents, one of which led up 
to the President’s decision. This was a joint memorandum from 
Secretary Gates and Dr. Glennan, on October 21, both of them con¬ 
curring and proposing that the Saturn project be transferred to 
NASA and that NASA assume as a civilian responsibility, the devel¬ 
opment of future large launch vehicle systems. 

Also, the Army-NASA agreement, which the chart shows as 
November 16, and Mr. Brucker actually signed on the 18th, is also a 
document which will interest the committee. It sets forth the basic 
philosophy we followed as we negotiated out the various problems 
involved in the transfer. 

We developed a detailed transfer plan which has been turned over 
to your committee staff. This was completed December 11, and 
agreed to by Secretary Brucker, Dr. Glennan and the Secretary of 
Defense, on December 16. 

You then got the President’s actual plan January 14. Under the 
present arrangement, as you know, this wffll await the action of the 
Congress for 60 days unless either an adverse or a favorable resolu¬ 
tion shall have been passed in the meantime. 

(The two documents referred to above follow:) 

October 21, 1959. 

Memorandum for the President 

Subject: Responsibility and organization for certain space activities. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have agreed upon, 
and recommend to the President, certain actions designed to clarify responsi¬ 
bilities, improve coordination, and enhance the national space effort. The 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 29 


actions recommended below are consistent with the steps taken by the Secre¬ 
tary of Defense to clarify responsibilities and assignments in the field of 
military space applications within the Department of Defense. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator have agreed upon, and 
recommend to the President the following actions : 

(a) The assignment to NASA of sole responsibility for the development of 
new space booster vehicle systems of very high thrust. Both the DOD and 
NASA will continue with a coordinated program for the development of space 
vehicles based on the current ICBM and IRBM missiles and growth versions of 
these missiles. 

(&) The transfer from the Department of the Army to NASA of the De¬ 
velopment Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, including 
its personnel and such facilities and equipment which are presently assigned 
and required for the future use of NASA at the transferred activity, and such 
other personnel, facilities, and equipment for administrative and technical 
support of the transferred activity as may be agreed upon. 

(c) The provision by the Army to NASA of such administrative services 
as may be agreed upon to effect a smooth transition of management and 
funding responsibility of the transferred activity. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA are in agreement 
on the following: 

1. The Nation requires and must build at least one super booster and 
responsibility for this activity should be vested in one agency. There is, at 
present, no clear military requirement for super boosters, although there is a 
real possibility that the future will bring military weapons systems require¬ 
ments. However, there is a definite need for super boosters for civilian space 
exploration purposes, both manned and unmanned. Accordingly, it is agreed 
that the responsibility for the super booster program should be vested in NASA. 
It is agreed that the recommendations to center this function in NASA and to 
transfer the Development Operations Division of ABMA to NASA are independ¬ 
ent of any decisions on whether either or both of the super booster systems 
currently under development are continued in their presently conceived form. 

2. The transfer of the Development Operations Division of ABMA shall 
include transfer of responsibility for Saturn, together with 1960 funds allocated 
for the project, and transfer to the NASA 1961 budget of such amounts as may 
be approved for this project in the 1961 Department of Defense budget. 

3. In carrying out its responsibilities, NASA will keep the Department of 
Defense thoroughly and completely informed on its booster program and will 
be fully responsive to specific requirements of the Department of Defense for the 
development of superboosters for future military missions as requested by the 
Secretary of Defense. 

4. It is NASA’s intent to center at the transferred activity the bulk of its 
space booster vehicle systems work, including an appropriate research and 
development effort, and ultimately, substantial responsibility for NASA launch 
operations. 

5. It is agreed that NASA will provide support to the Department of Defense 
and military services at the transferred activity in the same manner as it now 
does at all other field centers. 

6. The management and employment of the transferred activity will be the 
responsibility of NASA, and no commitment is possible with respect to levels 
of staffing or funding for the operation. NASA, however, will make every 
possible effort within its responsibilities and resources to utilize the capabilities 
of the Development Operations Division of ABMA. 

7. The transfer of personnel, facilities, and equipment will be on a nonreim¬ 
bursable basis. 

8. The Department of the Army will provide and maintain on a reimbursable 
basis stationwide services as required by NASA within the Redstone Arsenal 
complex. 

9. NASA will provide for continuation, transfer, or phasing out of military 
projects underway at the transferred activity as may be requested and to the 
extent funded by the Department of Defense, and will undertake at the trans¬ 
ferred activity such additional military projects as may be agreed upon by NASA 
and the Department of Defense. 

10. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and NASA, 
recognizing the value to the Nation’s space program of maintaining at a high 


30 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 


level the present competence of ABMA, will cooperate to preserve the con¬ 
tinuity of the technical and administrative leadership of the group. 

11. The detailed implementation of the actions proposed will be accomplished 
through the subsequent negotiation of cooperative agreements between the 
Department of Defense and NASA. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have reached agree¬ 
ment and recommend approval of the above actions in the firm belief that 
the national space effort requires a strong military space effort by the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense, and clear lines of responsibility and authority if the United 
States is to employ its best efforts in the exploration of outer space and to 
assure the defense of the Nation. 

If the President approves the recommended actions set forth in (a), (b), 
and ( c) above, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA will 
proceed immediately to form the necessary staff teams to develop the required 
implementing documents. 

(Signed) Thomas S. Gates, 

Acting Secretary of Defense. 

(Signed) T. Keith Glennan, 

Administrator , NASA. 

October 30,1959. 

Approved, Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 2,1959. 

November 16, 1959. 

Agreement Between the Department of the Army and NASA on the 

Objectives and Guidelines for the Implementation of the Presidential 

Decision to Transfer a Portion of ABMA to NASA 

a. authority 

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-568, 72 Stat. 
426) 

B. REFERENCES 

1. Memorandum for the President, subject: Responsibility and Organization, 
for Certain Space Activities, dated October 21, 1959, in behalf of the Secretary 
of Defense by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Dr. T. Keith Glennan, 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

2. Cooperative agreement on the Army Ordnance Missile Command between 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the 
Army dated December 3,1958. 

c. PURPOSE 

The purpose of this agreement is to supplement the agreement between the 
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA with respect to the trans¬ 
fer of a portion of ABMA to NASA and the assignment to NASA of certain 
responsibilities in the space booster vehicle field to the extent these actions in¬ 
volve the Department of the Army. The areas covered by this agreement are— 

1. Generalized agreement on the objectives to be sought; 

2. Method and procedure for conducting negotiations and arriving at 
detailed agreements; and 

3. Timing of the required actions. 

d. policy 

The Army and NASA agree and recognize that abrupt changes or other 
disrupting actions which adversely affect either the ongoing military or space 
programs must be avoided. The Army and NASA therefore agree to establish 
as the dominant consideration, with respect to timing, funding, and pace of 
agreed-upon actions, that there be no adverse effect on current programs. To 
this end, each party will cooperate in the rendering of service to the other, 
to the degree necessary to achieve this objective. Until such time as the 
transfer is approved by the Congress, reference B-2 will continue in effect. 

E. GENERAL OBJECTIVES 

The objectives of the negotiations are to arrive at a mutually agreeable 
detailed plan for implementation of the President’s decision to transfer a 
portion of ABMA, primarily the Development Operations Division (DOD), to 
NASA. The plan is to provide for— 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 31 


1. The transfer to NASA of the personnel, facilities, and equipment presently 
assigned to the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency. However, NASA recognizes that certain employees of this Division 
are primarily engaged in the technical supervision of contractors and monitor¬ 
ing or management of military weapons systems and components. NASA 
further recognizes that the Army regards the accomplishment of such functions 
by the Army as essential. NASA and the Army will reach mutual agreement 
as to those personnel who desire to and will remain with the Army for 
accomplishment of Army programs, with full recognition that the balanced 
capability of DOD will not be impaired. 

2. The transfer to NASA of such other personnel, facilities, and equipment 
of the ABMA and Redstone Arsenal as agreed upon for administrative and 
technical support of the transferred activity. Insofar as practicable, NASA and 
the Army will give full consideration to the desires of individuals to remain 
with the Army or to transfer to NASA. 

3. Identification and agreement concerning stationwide services which can be 
operated more effectively and economically on a centralized basis serving both 
NASA and the Army in order to avoid unnecessary duplicate organizations. 
This shall include the appropriate means of assessing reimbursable costs on 
the users. 

4. Provision for the continued detail of enlisted technical personnel presently 
assigned to DOD to the extent mutually agreed upon. 

5. Identification and use or transfer of land required for DOD operations 
as may be agreed upon. It is recognized that NASA, with respect to its possible 
future needs for land, will participate as a member of the Master Planning 
Board in the long-range land utilitization planning of Redstone Arsenal. 

6. Identification and agreement on joint use of certain Redstone Arsenal test 
facilities and ranges which might be needed for use in future Army and/or 
NASA programs. The objective here is to avoid building duplicate facilities 
wherever joint-use agreements could meet the needs. 

7. Identification and transfer to NASA of stocks and inventories assigned to 
or purchased for DOD which would be used primarily in the performance of 
NASA missions. Items which would be used primarily in the performance of 
Army missions will remain the property of the Army. General purpose items 
and supplies will be shared as agreed upon. 

8. Provision for continued funding by the Army and NASA through fiscal 
year 1960 of their respective programs at ABMA which had been approved 
prior to the Presidential decision to transfer a portion of ABMA to NASA. 
NASA recognizes that Army funding in 1961 will be related only to those specific 
projects, including supporting research, it desires to place in the transferred unit. 

F. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 

1. The Army and NASA will each select and appoint a principal negotiator. 
For the NASA, the principal negotiator is the Director of Business Administra¬ 
tion, and, for the Army the Deputy Chief of Ordnance. 

2. The principal negotiators for the Army and NASA will agree upon and 
establish such subordinate study or negotiation teams as may be required. 
These teams will recommend to the principal negotiators an appropriate 
agreement for the area assigned. 

3. These agreements, as approved by the principal negotiators, will be con¬ 
solidated into an overall agreement and approved though channels in both 
agencies, with final concurrence from the Secretary of the Army and the Admin¬ 
istrator of NASA respectively. 

4. Subsequent to the submission by the President to the Congress, the principal 
negotiators will continue to function as long as may be necessary to assist in the 
completion of planning for these transfer arrangements. 

G. TIMING 

1. The principal negotiators will schedule the staff studies and negotiation 
so as to permit submission of the necessary documents to the Executive Office 
of the President by December 15,1959. It is recognized that detailed agreements 
in every area of Army-NASA relations may not be possible in the time available; 
however, agreement in meaningful principle must be reached in every major 
area and work will be expendited to complete the detailed agreements at the 
earliest possible date. 


32 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

2. It is recognized that it may be desirable to stagger the effective dates for 
the transfer actions of certain personnel or supporting service functions, 
in order that both organizations can make the necessary adjustments without 
disruption of programs. 

Washington, D.C., November 18,1959. 

(Signature) Wilber M. Brucker, 

Secretary of the Army. 

(Signature) T. Keith Glennan, 

Administrator, NASA. 

Mr. Siefert. I would like to state here again for myself and my 
agency, a strong endorsement of the Sisk resolution. This will re¬ 
duce the period of time in which there can be any possible uncertainty 
by any of the key members of the staff concerning where their future 
lies in the Government and in space research. 

We are now at the next to last phase of this plan. We are begin¬ 
ning to develop the administrative and technical support staff which 
is essential if the Von Braun team is to continue its work under 
NASA without a major disruption in their work. This will take us 
several months to do properly. On July 1 we plan the formal take¬ 
over of the personnel from the Army. 

Perhaps I can clarify the point that Mr. Hechler raised on this 
as to why a resolution to have the transfer become effective “immedi¬ 
ately” would be important to us, even though the personnel and the 
fund administration would not transfer until July 1. 

Immediately after this decision was taken by the President, steps 
were worked out at the national level, so that the technical respon¬ 
sibility for the Saturn booster was transferred from the Department 
of Defense to NASA. This means our scientists are now working 
directly and daily with the Yon Braun team. The question whether 
Army or NASA is paying the personnel can in no way influence how 
fast we accelerate the Saturn project. 

Secondly the plan proposes that when the President’s plan takes 
effect, immediately on that date, all unobligated funds for the Saturn 
project are transferred from ARPA, which actually has the money, 
to NASA. 

However, they will still be spent through the Army. These funds 
are incorporated in an Army industrial fund, and those of you famil¬ 
iar with such accounting systems, will appreciate that it is a lot easier 
to put money into a working capital or industrial fund than to take 
it out in the middle of a fiscal year. 

NASA has the responsibility and the real problem of devising a 
complete accounting system from the ground up developing the pro¬ 
cedures, hiring the people, and working the system on a trial basis. 

We feel we will need every day between now and June 30 in order 
to be sure that system operates properly. 

Meanwhile, this will not hurt the Saturn project because the bills 
are just being paid through an Army fund rather than through a 
NASA fund. I do not believe the language used in the resolution 
would in any way impede our present plans; in fact, I think it 
would help greatly if the resolution went through on those terms. 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 33 


(The chart entitled ‘‘National Aeronautics and Space Adminis¬ 
tration Operating Organization” follows:) 


NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

OPERATING ORGANIZATION 



Mr. Siepert. Meanwhile, we have also reexamined our headquarters- 
field relationships and changed the organization to accommodate the 
Huntsville transfer. You have seen this chart in an earlier session. 
I merely want to point out to you that over on your left, the Hunts¬ 
ville facility—Dr. von Braun’s group—would report to the head¬ 
quarters of NASA through a new Office of Launch Vehicle Programs. 

This part of the program was set up specially after the President’s 
decision in order to make clear that Dr. von Braun’s group had a 
direct channel to the top in NASA through which it could get 
resolutions of any major problems. 


) 

> ) 















34 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 


(The chart entitled “U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command” 
follows:) 

US. ARMY OmANC£M/SS/tfCOMMAW 



Mr. Siepert. An arrangement to transfer this group from the Army 
also presents some organizational difficulties at Huntsville. 

Most of you, I believe, have been down at Redstone Arsenal. You 
will notice that group we are talking about is primarily included in 
the ABMA organization. It is only a part of the whole Army 
Ordnance Missile Command. 

The Redstone Arsenal organization itself is a housekeeping opera¬ 
tion. It has many, many people who provide plant services, shop 
maintenance, and the like, for the Von Braun group but they are 
not under his supervision at the present time. 













transfer of the development OPERATIONS DIVISION 35 
(The chart entitled “Army Ballistic Missile Agency” follows:) 

ARMY BALLISTIC MTSS/LB ASSWCY 



Mr. Siepert. On this chart, we can locate the actual technical group 
known as the Development Operations Division. This is the Von 
Braun team consisting of some 4,200 civilian employees. 

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency has other divisions. ABMA 
has the management resources which Von Braun used to get his work 
done. Budgeting, personnel, contracting with industry, safety, secu¬ 
rity, et cetera, all of these functions were staffed independently of Dr. 
von Braun. So our problem, when we move his team over to NASA, 
is to provide the same high quality of services that previously come 
from other parts of the Army. 























36 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

(The chart entitled “Proposed Staffing—Huntsville Facility” 
follows:) 

PROPOSED STAFFING - HUNTSVILLE FACILITY 


TO BE 

TRANSFERRED NASA 
PRESENT TO NASA REQUIREMENTS 

bhhbm amm ■■■■■■■■■■ bh— —b—ib— 

P£VPLOPMAT OPEW/Om P/l/. 4,213 3,863 4,300 


Apm/sraim? ifcw/cu supp'r - 8 is 1,200 


TOTAL 4,213 4,678 5,500 

VNOW SUPPLIED BY ARMY ORNANCE MISSLE COMMAND, PRIMARILY FROM A BMA 

AND REDSTONE ARSENAL. 

Mr. Siepert. The Development Operations Division has about 4,200 
people. Our budget before you provides for 4,300 civilian civil serv¬ 
ice personnel. 

The number to be transferred is shown here as an estimated 3,863. 
The difference between these two figures is the 350 individuals Sec¬ 
retary Brucker mentioned to you. We have agreed that the Army, 
in order to carry on its work and retain in the Army the capability 
to develop, to monitor, and to evaluate industrial contracts in the 
missile field, must have some of the technical talent of the sort that 
has been built up with Dr. von Braun. 

We believe that a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out 
with the cooperation of individuals concerned. Each individual 
sought by the Army will on his own option choose whether to remain 
with the Army or come to NASA. This can be done, in Dr. von 
Braun’s judgment, without destroying the basic capability of the Yon 
Braun team. 

We will replace then these 350 in two ways: by some outside re¬ 
cruitment but also by conversion of certain military specialist per¬ 
sonnel. Actually, quite a number of the experienced people in the 
Yon Braun team initially came to them through serving a period 
of enlistment or obligated service. They were assigned as special¬ 
ists and professionals in the military; they have learned the rocket 
business; they have developed a permanent interest in it; they have 
to stay. We will provide them an opportunity after their enlistment 
to convert to civil service. 








TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 37 


The support picture we studied very carefully to determine wliat 
functions are needed. It appears that about 1,200 positions will be 
required in order to be sure there is no breakup of the logistics, 
the technical support, and management services behind the Von 
Braun team. 

Vow, actually, the Army must keep many of these services at or 
near their present staffing levels to maintain their operations. The 
agreement is that NASA will be able actively to recruit 815 of the 
1,200 shown there—that is 815 from the existing Huntsville 
organizations. 

(The chart entitled “Provision of Administrative Services” 
follows:) 

PROVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 


PERFORMED BY NASA 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 

* ACCOUNTING 

* BUDGETING 

* PERSONNEL 
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY 
MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS a GROUNDS 
OFFICE SERVICES 

* MAIL AND MESSENGER SERVICES 
tf TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY AND GUARD SERVICES 
SAFETY 

FACILITIES ENGINEERING 


PERFORMED FOR NASA BY ARMY 

UTILITY SERVICES 
& WATER 

* SEWAGE 

* ELECTRIC POWER 

* BOILER PLANT OPERATION 
PERIMETER SECURITY 
ACCESS ROADS 

TECHNICAL LIBRARY 
RAILROAD MAINTENANCE AND 
SWITCHING SERVICES 
FIRE PROTECTION 


Mr. Siepert. When you are creating a new organization out of 
what is a part of a larger Army setup, there are difficult decisions 
as to who is going to do what. The services shown on the left 
represent the services which NASA will built up as its own capa¬ 
bility. This is at the request of the Army since it wishes to use 
its available staff in support of Army military missions only. 

The services on the right are the services which the Army has 
agreed it will continue to supply us, on a reimbursable basis. You 
will notice that these on the right primarily represent the kinds 
of services for which a large capital investment has already been 
made. It would be costly and impracticable for the Government 
to try to duplicate two streamplants, for instance. 

The point has been raised with Secretary Brucker as to what will 
be the degree of cooperation between the two groups once that they 
are separated. I think it is significant to note that the technical 
library shown over here on the right will not be set up as two separate 




38 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

libraries. Now, this is indicative of the kind of cooperation we 
are arranging. AVe want to be sure that the Von Braun team re¬ 
mains fully aware of everything that is going on in the missile 
business so they will have the access to the same classified documents 
as do the Army personnel through one library. 

(The map referred to entitled "‘Facilities Location Map—Head¬ 
quarters, Test, and Laboratories Area” is not printed.) 

Mr. Siepert. The whole arsenal area is that shown by the cross- 
hatched outline. At the bottom you see the Tennessee Liver curling 
around the southern border. 

The problem here has been to identify the physical facilities which 
the Von Braun team needs for spacework. The agreements with 
the Army call for NASA’s getting complete availability on an ir¬ 
revocable permit of all of the area shown in the center in the dotted 
enclosure. The circled areas that are shown in black represent 
certain facilities which each uses occasionally and there is no reason 
to reproduce them. 

For instance, there is a dock, a river dock down here on the river 
which NASA will need to transport the Saturn down the Ten¬ 
nessee, to the Mississippi, and to the cape. However, the same dock, 
of course, will be used by the Army for its purposes. So these 
yellow areas then represent test or other facilities we will share 
in common. 

(The map referred to entitled “Facilities Location Map—Head¬ 
quarters, Test, and Laboratories Area” is not printed.) 

Mr. Siepert. A closer view of the actual area which will come 
under NASA’s control will show two concentrations of facilities. To 
the north, are all of the laboratory and assembly areas where the re¬ 
search work is done. Down to the south you see a test area where 
the big liquid propellant test stands are concentrated. We will use 
this area primarily for NASA work but again agreements have been 
worked out with the Army that, if they run into trouble with Jupi- 
ters at some later date, they can be put back on test stands and we will 
do the testing for them. 

I should point out one other area. In the upper right sector, an area 
is called “ABMA Headquarters.” This is an office structure. This 
building and one other area I will refer to, do represent problems for 
both Army and NASA. 

In looking at the total picture there is simply not enough office 
space to handle technical and management personnel for the two 
organizations. We have reached an agreement that for the present 
we will jointly share the ABMA Headquarters building. However, 
NASA will assume responsibility for requesting funds of the Con¬ 
gress to create its own headquarters building. This item is included 
in the budget which is before you today. 

The Chairman. Is that the building the committee met in for a 
briefing ? 

Mr. Siepert. I believe so, yes, sir. 

Secondly—there is a reciprocity on this—a give and take. The 
Army recognizes there is not enough room in the existing computa¬ 
tion laboratory—which is just to the south of the ABMA office build¬ 
ing—to house expanding Army needs and in addition take care of 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 39 


the increasing scientific computation and data processing for NASA 
as the Saturn program builds up. 

The Army then has agreed that they will seek to develop and build 
their own computation laboratory but for the moment we will share 
those facilities together. 

There are also facilities involved in Cape Canaveral. 

(The map referred to entitled “Cape Canaveral” is not printed.) 

Mr. Siepert. All of the shaded areas shown are facilities which 
the Army has operated. In the transfer agreements, all of the darker 
areas will be taken over completely by NASA. The crosshatched 
lighter areas will continue to be needed for the Army for Army 
weapons development missions. The new Pershing launching pad is 
one instance. The Jupiter launching pad will be needed for some of 
their combat training launches in the future. And one hanger that 
is up in the industrial area. 

I should call to your attention that at the extreme north of the cape 
you see the two dark boxes there. This is the location of the Saturn 
dock and the launching pad now under construction. A second 
launching pad will be needed and this will be just to the north of the 
one that you see here. 

Mr. Hechler. When will those Saturn launching pads be com¬ 
pleted ? 

Mr. Horner. There is a 2-year leadtime on building those struc¬ 
tures. The first one will be completed early in 1961. The second one, 
we are requesting funds for in fiscal year 1961, it will be available 
early in 1963. 

(The chart entitled “Army-NASA Transfer of Development Oper¬ 
ations Division (ABMA) at Huntsville, Ala., Facilities” follows:) 


ARMY-NASA TRANSFER 


OF 


DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION (ABMA) 


AT 


HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA 


FACILITIES 


LAND 


APPROX AMTS 

1,200 ACRES 


STRUCTURES a EQUIPMENT 

ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATION 

LABORATORIES 

SHOPS 

STORAGE 


TOTAL GROSS SPACE 

NO. OF BUILDINGS 

NO. OF TEST STANDS, PITS, ETC. 


$ 100 MILLION* 
460,000 SO FT 
320,000 SQ FT 
620,000 SQ FT 
240,000 SQ FT 
1,640,000 SQ FT 


98 

69 


JOINT USE WITH ARMY 
SATURN RIVER DOCK 
ARMY TEST FACILITIES 
ARMY AIRFIELD 
HQ ADMIN. (Temporary Use) 
ANTENNA TEST AREA 


ARMY TEST TRACK 
VARIOUS STORAGE FACILITIES 
QUICK-LOOK ANTENNA SITE 
LAUNCH EMPLACEMENT 
SPECIFIED CAPE CANAVERAL 


•includes $14 MILLION AT CAPE CANAVERAL, FLA. 


FACILITIES 








40 TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 

Mr. Siepert. As this summary chart shows, the Army will turn 
over 1,200 acres of land in the middle of the Arsenal for Dr. von 
Braun’s programs. This aggregates some $100 million in value, of 
which $14 million is at the cape. Incidentally at the cape, the ground 
rules are that these facilities all belong to the Air Force, if they are 
fixed to the ground. The Air Force holds title, but these facilities 
would be assigned to our use. 

Well, then at Huntsville, NASA ends up with approximately 98 
buildings that will be turned over to us and the facilities shown at the 
bottom of the summary chart are ones for which there will be joint 
use agreements between Army and us. 

Let me conclude by saying that this has been a difficult negotiation 
in terms of there being dozens of problems to be considered. Each 
of these problems has to be weighed against whether we might be 
destroying on the one hand Dr. von Braun’s capability to work for 
NASA, or destroying on the other hand the Army’s capability to 
continue its weapons missions. We have tried to reach a balance of 
these interests and the cooperation between the two parties, I think, 
has been remarkable. We believe the plan is realistic and would urge 
your acceptance and support of it. 

The Chairman. I personally want to commend you for having han¬ 
dled a difficult operation with as little friction as there appears to 
have been. 

Mr. Siepert. It has been a real opportunity. 

The Chairman. Mr. McCormack ? 

Mr. McCormack. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fulton? 

Mr. Fulton. There is good cooperation between ABMA and NASA 
at all levels ? 

Mr. Siepert. Excellent cooperation. I would not want you to infer 
there are no disagreements. The essence of our cooperation depends 
upon frank talk and we have lots of that. 

Mr. Fulton. And the program is progressing satisfactorily accord¬ 
ing to plan so that the transfer will be made on a planned program ? 

Mr. Siepert. Yes. 

We are just now approaching a critical part of the negotiation. We 
both agreed that we would not do any recruiting of each other’s people 
until every detail of these transfer plans had "been settled, and then 
we would set about an orderly recruitment. We are just now begin¬ 
ning that part of it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Miller. When we were down there you had a program where 
young enlisted men who had shown an interest in this were being 
brought in and assigned and then as they got out of the service were 
being offered jobs. Will that be continued now or is there any pro¬ 
gram for continuing that sort of recruitment ? 

Mr. Siepert. We agreed that the long-term question on this, Mr. 
Miller, should be looked at later. The Army agreed that they would 
not change the duty station of any of those technical people who are 
currently working with Dr. von Braun. They will be able to finish 
out their term with us and we will have a chance to interest them in a 
permanent career. 

Mr. Miller. It will ultimately dry up a source. 


TRANSFER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION 41 

Mr. Siepert. It will ultimately dry up a source, but there will be 
an opportunity later for us to take up with the Army whether there 
would not continue to be a training opportunity of very real value 
to the Army because they too can develop skilled people this way. 

The Chairman. Mr. McDonough? 

Mr. McDonough. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Anfuso ? 

Mr. Anfuso. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Chenoweth? 

Mr. Ciienoweth. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sisk? 

Mr. Sisk. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Bass? 

Mr. Bass. No questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Quigley? 

Mr. Quigley. No questions. 

The Chairman. Are there any questions at all of anybody ? 

Well, then the chairman will ask you a question: Now, with this 
arrangement for a joint use of facilities at different times; will that 
work satisfactorily or will you ultimately have to have your own 
separate facilities ? 

Mr. Siepert. We anticipate no difficulty on this in any other area 
except the office space or computation laboratory facilities. We can’t 
in this situation continue a joint use when there is not enough of either 
to satisfy the essential requirements of both organizations. But with 
respect to test stands or Cape Canaveral facilities and so forth, I can 
assure you on this point. No trouble. 

The Chairman. You are in favor of House Resolution 567? 

Mr. Siepert. Yes. 

The Chairman. By the same token you are against House Con¬ 
current Resolution 559, by Mr. Stratton ? 

Mr. Siepert. Yes. I most certainly would find that course of action 
an impossible problem to deal with at this point. 

The Chairman. There are no further questions? If not, gentle¬ 
men, we want to thank you very kindly. 

There are no suggestions about any changes in the verbiage in the 
resolutions or anything of that kind ? 

Mr. Siepert. No, it is quite clear to us. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. 

We will go into executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee proceeded in executive 
session.) 


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